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“INTRAGROUP GROUP” DISCRIMINATION: IS IT A VIABLE CLAIM?
It is clear that the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) would be violated if an employee were discriminated against because she was deaf. Would that also be true if the discrimination occurred, not because the person was deaf, but because she was not deaf enough? That was the issue in a recent case decided by the District of Columbia court of appeals, which held that those claims, if proven, would constitute a form of “intragroup” discrimination. Kimmel v. Gallaudet University, 22 AD Cases 277 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
The plaintiff in that case was the Dean of a school for deaf students. Although the Dean was legally deaf she was not fully deaf. She claimed that there was a “deaf culture” at the school which reflected the belief that deaf people were oppressed minorities, rather than disabled individuals, and favored the employment of people who believed in “deaf culture.” She claimed that she was harassed and that her job responsibilities were reduced because she was an advocate for “minority” students who did not believe in the precepts of deaf culture.
The court found that these claims, if proven, constituted discrimination under the District of Columbia Human Rights Act. It noted that the stated purpose of that Act was to end discrimination for any reason other than individual merit, and in that respect the DC Act was basically similar to Title VII. Relying on Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), which recognized a claim of discrimination based on failure to conform to gender stereotypes, the court concluded that the Dean’s claim of discrimination based on the nature and extent of her disability was viable because it was sufficiently analogous to the claim found viable in Price Waterhouse.
Although the Gallaudet decision arose under a District of Columbia law, it will likely have precedential effect under federal discrimination statutes because, as the court noted, the language of the DC law is very similar to the ADA, and the court used federal law under Title VII as the basis for its decision.
